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Note
Gender Stereotyping in Employment
Discrimination: Finding a Balance of
Evidence and Causation Under Title VII
Tracy L. Bach
During a job interview, the potential employer asks the fe-
male applicant whether her husband approves of her seeking
the job, when she will have her next child, and how she has ar-
ranged her child care. Although she is qualified for the posi-
tion, the employer does not hire her. On learning that the
company hired a man, she sues for employment discrimination
based on gender stereotyping. Whether the applicant will win
her case depends on her ability to prove that the employer not
only asked her these questions but also relied on her responses
to make the hiring decision. The degree of causation and the
kind of evidence necessary to link gender stereotyping with a
finding of employment discrimination depends largely on which
federal circuit hears her case.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,1 the Supreme Court at-
tempted to clarify the law on gender stereotyping in employ-
ment decisions. Since Price Waterhouse, however, the federal
circuits have implemented different standards of causation
linking stereotyping with discrimination. The different stan-
dards the courts employ seriously affect a woman's ability to
prove employment discrimination based on gender stereotyp-
ing2 and have led to disparate results for the same discrimina-
1. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
2. Some commentators argue that the way in which the federal courts
apply civil rights laws has a tremendous impact on the willingness of individu-
als to bring suit to enforce legal ideals of eradicating discrimination: "[Tihe
federal courts of appeals have much to say about the all-important ground
rules of civil rights litigation, since they are called upon to interpret Supreme
Court precedent and to decide fundamental questions in the absence of
Supreme Court precedent." Lewis M. Steel & Miriam F. Clark, The Second
Circuit's Employment Discrimination Cases: An Uncertain Welcome, 65 ST.
JoHN's L. REV. 839, 841 (1991).
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tory conduct. Moreover, the 1991 Civil Rights Act,3 while
explicitly modifying Price Waterhouse's causation standard,
fails to adequately define the relationship between discrimina-
tory animus and actionable Title VII claims. While courts now
accept that gender stereotyping provides grounds for an em-
ployment discrimination claim, and that the standard of causa-
tion plays a pivotal role in the case's outcome, a dispute
remains as to which analytical framework courts should em-
ploy to determine causation.
To date, the many commentators who have analyzed Price
Waterhouse have concluded that its resolution of Title VII cau-
sation issues lacks clarity.4 No commentators, however, have
looked beyond this case to review its effect on the lower courts'
approach to employment discrimination claims alleging gender
stereotyping. Moreover, no one has yet addressed the relation-
ship between causation and evidence, and proposed an approach
to Title VII gender stereotyping cases that links the two.
This Note highlights the inconsistent standards courts util-
ize and develops a framework for applying Title VII's "because
of" clause in a manner that unifies several existing approaches
to causation and evidence. Part I defines gender stereotyping
and places it within the evolution of employment discrimina-
tion law from the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to that
of 1991. Part II describes the varying standards courts pres-
ently apply when determining what factors motivated an em-
ployer's decision. Part III analyzes the courts' search for
proximate cause in employment discrimination and proposes a
framework that balances the degree of causation with the bur-
den of proof and evidentiary requirements. This Note suggests
that by explicitly recognizing the relationship between causa-
3. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
4. See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks, The Structure of Individual Disparate Treat-
ment Litigation After Hopkins, 6 LAB. LAW. 215, 215 (1990); Anita Cava, Tak-
ing Judicial Notice of Sexual Stereotyping, 43 ARx. L. REv. 27, 53 (1990);
Gerald A. Madek & Christine Neylon O'Brien, Women Denied Partnerships:
From Hishon to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 7 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 257, 289
(1990); Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Po-
sitions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 523 (1990); Jean Calhoun Brooks, Note,
The Supreme Court Liberates Title VII Mixed-Motive Cases from the Procrus-
tean Bed of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine Pretext Model, 25 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 345, 370-71 (1990); Tracey Gibbons Hanley, Note, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins: Attempting to Resolve the Mixed-Motive Dilemma, 64 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 289, 310-11 (1990); Susan Struth, Note, Permissible Sexual Stereotyping
Versus Impermissible Sexual Stereotyping: A Theory of Causation, 34 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REV. 679, 682 (1989).
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tion and evidence, courts will treat employment discrimination
claims of gender stereotyping under Title VII more consistently
and equitably.
I. GENDER STEREOTYPING AND EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
A. GENDER STEREOTYPING IN EMPLOYMENT
Stereotypes result from generalizations of social group be-
havior applied to individual group members "in terms of
preconceived characteristics whether or not the descriptions are
accurate." 5  Gender6 stereotyping7 cases thus turn not on
whether the stereotypes have some truthful foundation but
whether the decisionmaker has indiscriminately applied to indi-
vidual women the true or false attributes ascribed to women as
a group.8 Women seeking employment 9 encounter numerous
5. Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Stereotyping in the Workplace: Evidence of
Discrimination?, TRIAL, Jan. 1990, at 76; see also Madeline E. Heilman, Sex
Bias in Work Settings: The Lack of Fit Model, in 5 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. 269, 271 (L. L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw eds., 1983) (stereotypes
represent "a set of attributes ascribed to a group and imputed to its individual
members simply because they belong to that group"). Sociologists believe that
stereotyping occurs in a two-step process: first, categorization of individuals in
groups by oppositional terms like female and male, young and old, and black
and white; and second, attribution of certain group traits to individuals so cate-
gorized. Thomas L. Ruble et al., Sex Stereotypes: Occupational Barriers for
Women, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 339, 340 (1984).
6. Commentators often employ the terms gender, sex or sexual, and sex
role interchangeably when describing discrimination against women. This
Note will use gender.
7. Gender stereotypes include three kinds of "unconscious gender bias":
"prototypes," or the images strongly associated with individual members of a
specific occupation (for example, aggressive men as litigators); "schema," or
the personal and situational attributes used to explain behavior (for example,
men's achievement defined in terms of ability and women's in terms of luck or
effort); and "scripts," or definitions of appropriate behavior in a particular sit-
uation (for example, women not interrupting and talking less in groups of men
and women). Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1188-89 (1988).
Gender stereotyping in the law has a long tradition, dating from Justice
Bradley's now famous statement in Bradwell v. Illinois: "The paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother. This is the law of the Creator." 83 U.S. (1 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872).
8. Radford, supra note 4, at 487 n.63; see Esther D. Rothblum & Violet
Franks, Introduction: Warning! Sex-Role Stereotypes May be Hazardous to
Your Health, in THE STEREOTYPING OF WOMEN 3, 4 (Violet Franks & Esther
D. Rothblum eds., 1983) (gender stereotypes "do not describe how women and
men actually differ, but how society thinks they do").
9. In 1990, adult women represented 45% of the total U.S. workforce.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 2385,
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stereotypes1 ° that impede equal treatment 1 of women and men
in the workplace. Gender stereotyping harms women by re-
stricting workplace opportunities, 12 inhibiting opportunity for
career advancement, 13 and limiting earning power.'4 The no-
WORKING WOMEN: A CHARTBOOK 1 (1991) [hereinafter WORKING WOMEN].
The number of employed women has more than doubled since 1960, rising
from 21.9 million to 53.5 million in 1990; working women account for 60% of
the total increase in employment in that period. Id. at 11. Today, most
mothers work outside the home, including 75% of those with school-age chil-
dren and 52% of mothers with children under two. Id. at 35.
10. Ruble et al., supra note 5, at 351; see Cava, supra note 4, at 34-35 &
nn.30-37 (reviewing recent survey research on the large role gender stereotyp-
ing plays in society's treatment of women).
11. Stereotypes defeat equality because they "undermine the individual by
promoting unreasonable or untrue generalizations." Cava, supra note 4, at 28.
Cava cites the journalist Walter Lippman as first using the term stereotype in
such a manner. Lippman believed that:
A pattern of stereotypes is not neutral. It is not merely a way of sub-
stituting order for the great, blooming, buzzing confusion of reality.
It is not merely a short cut. It is all these things and something more.
It is the guarantee of our self-respect; it is the projection upon the
world of our own sense of our own value, our own position and our
own rights. The stereotypes are, therefore, highly charged with the
feelings that are attached to them. They are the fortress of our tradi-
tion, and behind its defenses we can continue to feel ourselves safe in
the position we occupy.
WALTER LIPPMAN, PUBLIC OPINION 96 (1922), quoted in Cava, supra note 4, at
29.
12. One commentator has noted the prevalence of gender-based segrega-
tion in the workplace: "Almost half of all employed women work in occupa-
tions that are at least eighty percent female, and over half of employed men
work in occupations that are at least eighty percent male." Maxine N.
Eichner, Note, Getting Women Work That Isn't Women's Work- Challenging
Gender Biases in the Workplace Under Title VII, 97 YALE L.J. 1397, 1397
(1988). For example, women represented almost 80% of all administrative
support and clerical workers but less than 9% of precision production, craft
and repair workers in 1990. WORKING WOMEN, supra note 9, at 38.
13. A study of the 11 industries making up almost 20% of the U.S.
workforce found that women accounted for 46% of nonsupervisory workers,
64% of workers in jobs with the least advancement possibilities and 5% of
workers in jobs with the most advancement potential. Eichner, supra note 12,
at 1398 n.4. More recently, a Department of Labor analysis of almost 100 For-
tune 1000 companies found that while women comprise 37.2% of all employ-
ees, they account for only 16.9% of all managers and only 6.6% of executive-
level managers. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A REPORT ON THE GLAss CEILING INITI-
ATrVE 6 (1991). The Department of Labor recognized the invisible, structural
barriers inhibiting the advancement of women employees when it created the
Glass Ceiling Initiative in 1989. Id. at 1-2. The Initiative focused on internal
education within the Department; a pilot study of nine companies; a public
awareness campaign; and recognition of those employers which voluntarily re-
moved their own "glass ceilings." Id. at 3. The pilot study reported findings in
1991 that women have less opportunity for advancement than originally antici-
pated; that women generally occupy higher positions than minorities; and that
1254 [Vol. 77:1251
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tion that women are the primary family caregivers represents
perhaps the most common stereotype facing working women
today.' 5
B. LOCATING GENDER STEREOTYPING IN TITLE VII
Plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,16 must first exhaust all
administrative remedies within the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC).'7 If the EEOC finds reasonable
cause after investigation, it first attempts conciliation and, fail-
ing that, brings a civil suit in federal district court.'8 Although
the statutory apparatus for raising Title VII claims requires re-
no systems of employee development exists specifically for women and minori-
ties. I&i at 13-15.
14. Women working full-time year round earn 65¢ for every dollar paid to
men. Eichner, supra note 12, at 1398 n.5. In 1986, a woman graduating with a
four-year college degree earned on average less than a man with a high school
diploma - $22,412 and $24,701, respectively. Id Approximately 35-40% of this
difference results from workplace gender segregation, see supra note 12, be-
cause historically female jobs pay less than historically male jobs. The re-
maining 60-65% of the earning discrepancy results from men earning more
than women at the same jobs. Id
15. Radford, supra note 4, at 475 n.21.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). Plaintiffs may also sue under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights of its own,
but rather provides a private cause of action against someone acting "under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State," who
deprives the claimant of a constitutional right. SUSAN M. OMILIAN & JEAN P.
KAMP, SEX-BASED EMPLOYMENT DIsCRUMNATION § 2.02, at 9 (1990). Plaintiffs
often raise § 1983 claims in conjunction with Title VII claims because they of-
fer the additional advantages of not requiring claimants to exhaust state or lo-
cal administrative remedies, offering a generally longer state statute of
limitations, allowing jury trials and providing for punitive damages. Id at 10.
Resort to § 1983 may change in future litigation, given the 1991 Civil Rights
Act's addition of jury trials and punitive damages to Title VII. See infra note
75.
17. The EEOC is the federal administrative agency that enforces and in-
terprets Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act. OMniLAN & KAMP, supra note 16, § 4.01, at 1. Claims, either by an
individual or a discriminated class, are made by or on behalf of a party (by the
EEOC) against an employer, labor organization or employment agency within
180 days of the unlawful practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e) (1988). The filing
period is extended to 300 days if the charging party initiates a state or local
agency proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), -5(f) (1988). If the EEOC does not find reason-
able cause, it dismisses the charge and notifies the charging party, who may
then initiate a private action within 90 days. Id Furthermore, although
§ 2000e-5(f)(3) states that Title VII actions may be brought in federal district
court, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a party may also
1993] 1255
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sort to the EEOC before filing a private cause of action, it does
not mandate total reliance on the bureaucratic mechanism.19
Complainants must only show a timely resort to the EEOC and
subsequent court filing.20 If the EEOC should choose to sue,
however, the agency limits the charging party's rights to inter-
vention in that suit.21
1. Title VII's language and legislative history
Title VII requires that employers, employment agencies,
and labor unions22 not discriminate against any person because
of race, color, religion, sex,23 or national origin.24 The broad
bring suit in state court. Donnelly v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 402,
405-09 (7th Cir.), affl'd, 493 U.S. 953 (1989).
19. If the EEOC does not sue within 180 days of filing, the charging party
may request the commission to issue a Notice of the Right to Sue, after which
the charging party has 90 days to file suit in federal court. OMILIAN & KAMP,
supra note 16, § 4.01, at 2. The EEOC may also initiate a "pattern and prac-
tice" lawsuit. Id. Due to the EEOC's usual backlog of charges, however, a
charging party typically either waits several years until the administrative pro-
cess has run its course, or files a private suit after the expiration date of the
commission's mandatory jurisdiction. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 11.2, at 427 (2d ed. 1988). For example, although
the EEOC in 1990 filed a record 523 suits and investigators resolved 67,415
charges, the pending inventory for the third year in a row was 46,071 charges.
John J. Ross, Trends in the Law, in 20TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT
LAW, at 23-24 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 416,
1991).
20. The Supreme Court declared that:
[A]bsence of a Commission finding of reasonable cause cannot bar suit
under an appropriate section of Title VII.... Respondent satisfied the
jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal action (i) by filing timely
charges of employment discrimination with the Commission and (ii)
by receiving and acting upon the Commission's statutory notice of the
right to sue.... The Act does not restrict a complainant's right to sue
to those charges as to which the Commission has made findings of
reasonable cause, and we will not engraft on the statute a require-
ment which may inhibit the review of claims of employment discrimi-
nation in the federal courts.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
22. Title VII applies to both private and public sector employers, includ-
ing the federal government. LEE M. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAw § 1:1 (2d ed. 1988). Exempted employers under Title VII include
religious institutions, Indian tribes and reservation businesses, and bona fide
private membership clubs. Id § 1:3, at 11.
23. Notably, sex did not appear in the original draft of the act, but rather
was added during the debate in an effort to defeat the bill. Leo Kanowitz, Sex-
Based Discrimination in American Law HII: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HAsTINGS L.J. 305, 310-12 (1968).
"The sex amendment can best be described as an orphan, since
neither the proponents nor the opponents of Title VII seem to have
1256 Vol. 77:1251
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sweep of Title VII's language has left it open to conflicting in-
terpretations of its intent. For example, critics of the Act have
argued that the lack of definitions for "discriminate" and "be-
cause of" obfuscate the legislators' intent.25 Given the lack of
detail in the Act's language, courts initially questioned whether
felt any responsibility for its presence in the Bill." The startling truth
is that the presence of the word "sex" is the result of what could be
termed an historical accident. H.R. 7152, later to become known as
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was introduced in the House by Repre-
sentative Emanuel Celler on June 20, 1963, without any mention of
the word "sex." While the bill was before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, the sex amendment was introduced by Committee Chairman
Howard Smith. Representative Smith was an opponent of the bill,
and indications are that he proposed the amendment in the hope that
its addition would lead to defeat of the entire bill. There was no testi-
mony on the amendment before the Judiciary Committee, nor did any
organization petition Congress to add the word "sex" to the bill.
Anthony R. Mansfield, Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21 VAND. L. REV. 484, 491-92 (1968) (citation
omitted); see also Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOK. L. REv. 62, 64-68 (1965) (summarizing the
legislative process that shaped Title VII); Francis J. Vaas, Title VI1 Legisla-
tive History, 7 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 431 (1966) (describing in detail the
legislative process).
Courts have repeatedly commented on the paucity of legislative history
for interpreting Title VII. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
143-45 (1976) (considering whether Congress intended Title VII to include dis-
crimination based on pregnancy); Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148,
1158 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding the Act's legislative history of "little guidance"
when determining the requisite causal relationship between gender and wage
differential); International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1101-05 (3d Cir. 1980) (questioning whether
Congress intended Title VII to relate to the Equal Pay Act regarding sex-
based wage discrimination), cert denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
24. Title VII provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or to other-
wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
25. Senator Clark and Senator Clifford, two of the bill's floor managers,
replied that:
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is vague. In
fact it is clear and simple and has no hidden meanings. To discrimi-
nate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or
favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor
which are prohibited by section 704 are those which are based on any
five of the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and national
1993] 1257
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Congress intended to include gender stereotyping as a form of
impermissible employment discrimination.
Although the legislative history of Title VII often provides
scant or conflicting specifics on gender discrimination, 2 6 it does
provide a clear picture of Congress's intent to balance employee
and employer rights. On the one hand, the legislators sought to
rid the country of discrimination directed at minority groups,
especially African-Americans.2 7 On the other, they did not
want to usurp management's role in hiring and firing, reason-
ing that "[i]nternal affairs of employers.., must not be inter-
fered with except to the limited extent that correction is
required in discrimination practices. '28 The tension between
these two objectives develops where both discriminatory and le-
gitimate reasons enter the employment decision, a boundary
stereotyping often broaches.
2. Judicial Interpretation of Title VII
The Supreme Court has firmly established that Title VII
addresses gender stereotyping.29 The Court observed that
given Title VII's emphasis on the individual, "even a true gen-
eralization about the class is an insufficient reason for disquali-
fying an individual to whom the generalization does not
apply."30  Lower courts agree that Title VII affords relief for
employment discrimination based on stereotyping and recog-
nize that even subtle attitudes and behavior may evince dis-
origin. Any other criterion or qualification for employment is not af-
fected by this title.
110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964). Moreover, commentators have observed that
while numerous statutes proscribe discrimination, none define the term. See,
e.g., Sam Stonefield, Non-Determinative Discrimination, Mixed Motives, and
the Inner Boundary of Discrimination Law, 35 BuFF. L. REv. 85, 86 (1986).
26. Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit wrote that "the legislative history
of Title VII is in such a confused state that it is of minimal value in its explica-
tion." Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1970).
27. See 110 CONG. REC. 7212-14 (1964).
28. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 29, reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2516.
29. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707 (1978). In Manhart, the Court observed that:
It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predi-
cated on mere "stereotyped" impressions about the characteristics of
males and females. Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a
woman's inability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer ac-
ceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for
paying them less.
30. Id. at 708.
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criminatory motives. 3 ' The judiciary thus solidified the
originally attenuated place of gender discrimination-and stere-
otyping as a form of it-in Title VII.
C. THE ROLE OF CAUSATION IN FINDING DISCRIMINATION
Although courts agree that Title VII affords relief for em-
ployment discrimination based on gender stereotyping, they dif-
fer greatly on how stereotypical behavior ripens into actionable
discrimination. The controversy turns on the issues of causa-
tion and the proper allocation of the burdens of proof. 32 Deter-
mining legislative intent regarding the relationship between
cause and effect in employment discrimination has proven elu-
sive, spawning a wide array of judicial interpretation.33 While
courts agree that Congress did not intend to eradicate only that
discrimination constituting the "sole" factor in the employment
decision,34 comments made during the legislative battle35 do not
31. See Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 656 F.2d 1337, 1343 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1981) (stating that subtle and "benign" attitudes may be characterized as
discriminatory); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.)
("In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."), cert denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971).
32. Parties to a suit carry two separate burdens of proof-the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion. The burden of production, also
known as the "burden of evidence," requires offering evidence on a specific
fact at issue to a judge's satisfaction; if insufficiently met, a judge may decide
the case without jury consideration. EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., McCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE 947 (3d ed. 1984). The burden of persuasion comes into play only
after the parties have sustained their burdens of production. This burden be-
comes critical when the jury or trial judge has some doubt about the issue at
hand. Where parties holding the burden of persuasion fail to convince the
factfinders of their positions, the judge will resolve, or instruct the jury to re-
solve, these issues against the burdened party. Id. One commentator observed
that "[e]ssentially, two issues have been left to the lower courts: how much
evidence is necessary to show that an allegedly nondiscriminatory reason was,
in fact, a pretext for discrimination; and what standard of causation should be
applied." Steel & Clark, supra note 2, at 862.
33. One observer queried upon Title VII's passage that:
For an unfair employment practice to exist, what must the causal
nexus or relationship between improper motive and the overt act?
Must the improper motive be the dominant factor, a substantial con-
tributing factor or merely a factor leading to the overt act? The an-
swers to these questions await the clarification of the law by ...
judicial decision.
Vaas, supra note 23, at 456-57.
34. Senator McClellan's amendment defining a Title VII violation "as oc-
curring only when the prohibited discriminatory factor was the sole ground
for the adverse action" was soundly defeated. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,837-38
1993] 1259
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
clarify the boundary at the other end of the causation "contin-
uum."36 Consequently, courts have filled in the causation gap
with a variety of standards derived from their individual con-
struction of legislative intent.
1. Single Motive or "Pretext" Cases
Courts initially decided Title VII disparate treatment
cases37 under the theory that a single reason motivated the de-
fendant's actions toward the plaintiff.38 Courts required no
separate showing of causation because single motive analysis
presumed that only one factor caused the discriminatory behav-
ior. Moreover, the Supreme Court introduced in McDonnell
Douglas v. Green39 a method for proving intentional discrimi-
nation using circumstantial evidence, given plaintiffs' difficulty
in producing direct evidence.40
(1964). During debate, one of the leading critics of the amendment argued
that it "would render Title VII totally nugatory. If anyone ever had an action
that was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind of animal from any
I know of." Id at 13,837.
35. For example, Senator Humphrey, the bill's sponsor, remarked that
"[w]hat the bill does... is simply to make it an illegal practice to use [sex] as a
factor in denying employment." 110 CONG. REC. 13,088 (1964).
36. Professor Stonefield coined this phrase to describe the array of causa-
tion standards used by the courts in deciding Title VII cases. Stonefield, supra
note 25, at 114.
37. Two types of employment discrimination claims arise under Title
ViI-disparate treatment and disparate impact. "Title VII proscribes not only
the discriminatorily motivated disparate treatment of statutorily protected in-
dividuals but also facially neutral practices which have a disparate impact
upon protected individuals." MODJESKA, supra note 22, § 1:1 (footnote omit-
ted). Disparate treatment involves treating someone less favorably because of
one's race, color, religion, sex or national origin and requires proof of discrimi-
natory intent or motivation. Id § 1:6. The Supreme Court declared that
"[u]ndoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in
mind when it enacted Title VII." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). In contrast, disparate impact involves
facially neutral practices unjustified by business necessity which affect pro-
tected groups more severely than unprotected groups. A disparate impact
claim focuses on the discriminatory practice's relation to the job rather than
on the employer's motivation or intent. MODJESKA, supra note 22, § 1:6. The
Court has recognized that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the con-
sequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). This Note addresses disparate treat-
ment issues only.
38. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256 (1981); McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).
39. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
40. The Second Circuit has recognized the evidentiary difficulties that
confront plaintiffs in this class of cases:
[E]mployment discrimination is often accomplished by discreet manip-
1260 [Vol. 77:1251
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The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework fol-
lows three steps. Initially the plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case of discriminatory action, carrying at this point both
the burdens of production and persuasion.41 Next the responsi-
bility shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for its action.42 The defendant need not,
however, prove the absence of a discriminatory motive.43 Fi-
nally, if the defendant asserts a nondiscriminatory reason for
its employment decision, the plaintiff carries the burden of per-
ulations and hidden under a veil of self-declared innocence. An em-
ployer who discriminates is unlikely to leave a "smoking gun," such as
a notation in an employee's personnel file, attesting to a discrimina-
tory intent. A victim of discrimination is therefore seldom able to
prove his or her claim by direct evidence and is usually constrained to
rely on the cumulative weight of circumstantial evidence.
Rosen v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); see
also Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating that two
evidentiary problems exist in most employment discrimination cases: direct
evidence is usually unavailable or is under the control of the employer); Mo-
DJESKA, supra note 22, § 1:7, at 17 ("Direct evidence of subjective discrimina-
tory intent is rarely available, particularly to the discriminatee."); Rhode,
supra note 7, at 1194-95 (noting that direct proof of discrimination is even
more rare in situations where the discrimination is rooted in stereotyping be-
cause often decisionmakers are either unlikely to express their biases openly
or are unaware of them).
41. To meet this burden, McDonnell Douglas requires that the complain-
ant show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802.
42. Id. While some commentators have viewed the plaintiff's prima facie
standard as minimal, others have seen the employer's responsive burden as
"comparatively slight." MODJESKA, supra note 22, § 1:7, at 24. Nonetheless
the prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination "because we presume
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
43. Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978). In Burdine, the
Court specifically stated that the defendant bore only the burden of produc-
tion, not a burden of persuasion:
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the pre-
sumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff
was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that
it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if
the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it
discriminated against the plaintiff.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-55.
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suading the court that the reason constitutes a mere "pretext"44
and does not represent the true reason for the employer's ac-
tion.45 The Seventh Circuit described this method of proof as
"permitting the plaintiff to prove his case by eliminating all
lawful motivations, instead of proving directly an unlawful
motivation.146
Although the Court noted in McDonnell Douglas that the
burden shifting method would not apply to all fact situations,47
lower courts widely applied it regardless of whether the cases
presented direct or indirect evidence.48 Courts began to employ
44. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. "Because of the employee's easy
burden of establishing a prima facie case and the employer's normal ability to
articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, most dis-
parate treatment cases turn on the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate that the
nondiscriminatory reason offered by the employer was a pretext for discrimi-
nation." Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir. 1985) (citation
omitted).
45. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. The plaintiff need not introduce new evi-
dence to prove the employer's use of pretext. "[lnitial evidence, combined
with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the
defendant's explanation." Id. at 255 n.10.
46. La Montagne v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405,
1410 (7th Cir. 1989).
47. 411 U.S. at 802 n.13 ("The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases,
and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent
is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.").
The Court repeated this observation in other cases. See, e.g., Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) ("[The McDonnell Douglas test
is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination.
The shifting burdens of proof... are designed to assure that the 'plaintiff [has]
his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.' ") (alteration in
original) (citations omitted); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983) ("[P]laintiff may prove his case by direct or
circumstantial evidence."); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978) ("The method suggested in McDonnell Douglas... was never intended
to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly
way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the
question of discrimination."); see also Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715
F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1983) ("It should be clear that the McDon-
nell/Burdine method of proving a prima facie case pertains primarily, if not
exclusively, to situations where direct evidence of discrimination is lacking."),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1204 (1984).
48. Direct evidence has been defined as proof which, if accepted as true,
resolves the question at issue. CLEARY ET AL., supra note 32, at 543. Indirect
or circumstantial evidence requires additional reasoning or inferences to reach
the ultimate conclusion of fact. Id. Courts have characterized evidence as di-
rect or indirect in a very fact-specific manner, for "the various circuits have
about as many definitions for 'direct evidence' as they do employment discrim-
ination cases." Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 82 (1992). For examples of direct evidence classifica-
tions, see infra notes 67 and 90.
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direct evidence in two ways-either to avoid the burden shift-
ing model altogether,49 or to prove during the third prong that
the defendant's proffered reason amounted to merely a
pretext. 0
2. Mixed Motive Cases
Along with the growing confusion over evidence, courts be-
gan to realize the limitations of the single motive, "either-or"
approach. Increasingly sophisticated courts, litigants, and attor-
neys recognized that this causation framework failed to "reflect
realistically the variety of factors at play in the decisionmaking
process." 51 Throughout the 1980s, courts became more aware
that most challenged employment decisions resulted from not
one, but rather a mix of motivations, both legal and illegal.52
Hence the courts moved toward a mixed motives framework
that required plaintiffs to show a direct connection between the
discriminatory factor and the employment decision-how the il-
legitimate factor had caused the resulting outcome.
The definition of "causation" thus became critical in the
determination of liability under Title VII, although prior to
Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court had barely addressed the
standard of causation applicable in Title VII disparate treat-
ment cases.53 Adapting to the mixed motive framework, some
lower courts employed a "discernible factor" standard,5 consid-
49. See Blalock v. Metal Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 707-08 (6th Cir. 1985);
Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of America, Inc., 758 F.2d 1525, 1529-30 (11th Cir.
1985); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875-76 (11th Cir. 1985); Bell v. Bir-
mingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1204 (1984).
50. See Tye v. Board of Educ., 811 F.2d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir.), cert denied,
484 U.S. 924 (1987).
51. Radford, supra note 4, at 514.
52. Id. at 508. As Stonefield observed, mixed motive analysis "reflects the
contrast between the discrete nature of the regulatory prohibition [against dis-
crimination] and the richness of human interactions.... [P]eople's motives are
complex and multi-faceted. It can rarely be said that any single stimulus is
totally responsible for a particular act; many factors normally contribute."
Stonefield, supra note 25, at 113.
53. Noting the Court's dearth of guidance on causation issues, one com-
mentator said that "the courts have been cast adrift by the Supreme Court's
use of murky language and apparently inconsistent rationales; evidence of the
chaos so created is easily seen in recent appellate decisions." Charles A. Ed-
wards, Direct Evidence of Discriminatory Intent and the Burden of Proof- An
Analysis and Critique, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 32 (1986).
54. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320-24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(finding that Title VII's language indicates a broad reading of liability but a
more restricted standard of remedy). The taint standard developed in re-
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ered the most liberal, while the majority applied a "but for"
test,55 viewed as the most conservative. 56 Many courts utilized
standards that fell in between, including "significant factor, '57
"substantial part,"58 and "motivating factor."59  The use of
these differing causation standards produced a "disarray" of
decisions.60
3. Price Waterhouse
The Court's decision in Price Waterhouse changed the
landscape of employment discrimination cases involving gender
stereotyping. For the first time, the Supreme Court explicitly
discussed gender stereotyping, with the plurality6' finding that
stereotyping provides evidence of discrimination.62  Price
sponse to the judiciary's understanding of the "broad congressional design" of
Title VII. Brooks, supra note 4, at 225 n.58.
55. See, e.g., McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n, 830 F.2d 659, 664 (7th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 914 (1988); Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818
F.2d 1148, 1161 (5th Cir. 1987); Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759
F.2d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 1985).
56. While the theoretical "sole factor" standard, requiring the plaintiff to
prove that the impermissible criteria constituted the sole reason for the em-
ployment decision, is arguably more conservative than the "but for" test, the
judiciary has not applied it given the lack of textual support in Title VII. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163,
1166 (9th Cir. 1984) (drawing standard from Burdine language that plaintiff
must prove discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated employer);
Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1983).
58. See, e.g., Berl v. County of Westchester, 849 F.2d 712, 714 (2d Cir.
1988).
59. See, e.g., Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 937 (1st Cir. 1987).
60. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 238 n.2 (1989) ("This ques-
tion [of causation] has, to say the least, left the Circuits in disarray.").
61. Price Waterhouse was decided by a four member plurality composed
of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justices O'Connor and
White filed concurring opinions. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Rehnquist and Scalia joined. Id at 231.
62. Justice Brennan sharply rebuked the defendant's attempts to trivial-
ize gender stereotypes:
Although the parties do not overtly dispute this last proposition [the
definition of a motivating factor], the placement by Price Waterhouse
of "sex stereotyping" in quotation marks throughout its brief seems to
us an insinuation either that such stereotyping was not present in this
case or that it lacks legal relevance. We reject both possibilities. As
to the existence of sex stereotyping in this case, we are not inclined to
quarrel with the District Court's conclusion that a number of the
partners' comments showed sex stereotyping at work.... As for the
legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group, for "'[ i ]n forbid-
ding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
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Waterhouse also offered a framework for analyzing mixed mo-
tive63 cases that broke with the McDonnell/Burdine approach
to single motive analysis. The decision has been characterized
as adding "clarity and complexity to the evidentiary scheme
governing the burden of persuasion in disparate treatment
cases but, unfortunately, leav[ing] murky the concept of
causation."64
Ann Hopkins brought her employment discrimination suit
against Price Waterhouse after the firm denied her admission
to partnership.6 5 Justice Brennan, writing the plurality opin-
ion, found that Hopkins had clearly established discriminatory
factors and their linkage to the decision-making process.66 He
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.'"
Id. at 250-51 (quotations omitted).
63. Price Waterhouse also highlights the way the courts overlap both sin-
gle and mixed motive frameworks. See Radford, supra note 4, at 514 n.197.
64. Brooks, supra note 4, at 215. Another commentator has noted that:
[C]ourts had intertwined inextricably the standard of causation with
the allocation of burdens of proof, and had vacillated between the cau-
sation standard as a necessary component in the liability determina-
tion, or only in arriving at a remedy. The Supreme Court's decision
[in Price Waterhouse] purported to settle all three of these problems.
In reality, after sifting through the semantics of the plurality opinion,
the two concurrences, and the dissent, it remains unclear exactly
what has been accomplished by Hopkins.
Radford, supra note 4, at 523.
65. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231-32. Price Waterhouse based its deci-
sion on comments of partners solicited by the Admissions Committee, includ-
ing suggestions that Hopkins was "'macho,'" had matured from "'a tough-
talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed manager to an authoritative, formida-
ble but much more appealing lady partner candidate,"' and should take "'a
course at charm school.'" Id. at 235. When the firm's Policy Board chose not
to offer Hopkins partnership, her supervisor informed her of the decision by
advising that she "'walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."' Id.
66. Whether Justice Brennan found that the stereotypical comments
amounted to direct evidence remains an open question. While he concluded
that Price Waterhouse's comments were not simply "stray remarks" or "'dis-
crimination in the air,'" he declined to categorize the evidence or even "sug-
gest a limitation on the possible ways of proving that stereotyping played a
motivating role in an employment decision." Id. at 251-52.
Justice O'Connor, in contrast, clearly stated in her opinion that a plaintiff
in a mixed motive case "must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate cri-
terion was a substantial factor in the decision." Id at 276 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring). She defined direct evidence by what it is not-stray remarks and
statements by nondecisionmakers. Id. at 277. O'Connor further clarified the
meaning of direct evidence by explaining how Hopkins had presented direct
evidence:
Ann Hopkins had taken her proof as far as it could go. She had
proved discriminatory input into the decisional process, and had
1993] 1265
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
noted that the process relied upon all partners' comments and
that "[a] negative comment, even when made in the context of
a generally favorable review, nevertheless may influence the
decision maker to think less highly of the candidate. '6 7
Turning to the causation standard, Justice Brennan found
that the plaintiff establishes a prima facie Title VII violation
where gender constituted a "motivating part" of the employ-
ment decision.68 The plurality opinion then offered the defend-
ant an opportunity to avoid liability by showing as an
affirmative defense69 that the employer "would have made the
same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a
proved that participants in the process considered her failure to con-
form to the stereotypes credited by a number of the decisionmakers
had been a substantial factor in the decision. It is as if Ann Hopkins
were sitting in the hall outside the room where partnership decisions
were being made. As the partners filed in to consider her candidacy,
she heard several of them make sexist remarks in discussing her suit-
ability for partnership. As the decisionmakers exited the room, she
was told by one of those privy to the decisionmaking process that her
gender was a major reason for the rejection of her partnership bid.
Id at 272-73.
67. Id. at 257. Brennan also declared that "[ilt takes no special training to
discern sex stereotyping" in some of the partners' remarks. Id at 256. The
amicus curiae brief of the American Psychological Association (APA) defined
the linking process in more concrete terms. It described three factors that en-
courage workplace stereotyping- "(1) [t]he rarity of the stereotyped individual
within the evaluation setting;, (2) the ambiguity of the criteria used to make an
evaluation; and (3) the paucity of information available to evaluators." Brief
for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Respon-
dent at 20, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167).
68. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244. Brennan defined a motivating fac-
tor as "if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its rea-
sons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would
be that the applicant or employee was a woman." Id at 250. In adopting this
causation standard, Brennan did not apply the "but for" test favored by the
majority of circuit courts prior to Price Waterhouse, reasoning that "[t]o con-
strue the words 'because of' as colloquial shorthand for 'but-for causation,' as
does Price Waterhouse, is to misunderstand them." Id. at 240. He grounded
his rationale in Title VII's legislative history, noting-
We need not leave our common-sense at the doorstep when we inter-
pret the statute. It is difficult for us to imagine that, in the simple
words "because of," Congress meant to obligate a plaintiff to identify
the precise causal role played by legitimate and illegitimate motiva-
tions in the employment decision she challenges. We conclude, in-
stead, that Congress meant to obligate her to prove that the employer
relied upon sex-based considerations in coming to its decision.
Id. at 241-42.
69. "IT]he plaintiff must persuade the factfinder on one point, and then
the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another." Id. at 246.
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role., 70
The plurality thus distinguished Price Waterhouse's mixed
motive framework from the McDonnell/Burdine single motive
method,71 acknowledging the distinct fact-finding goals of each
kind of case.72 Under mixed motive analysis, the defendant
bears both the burdens of production and persuasion once the
plaintiff proves discriminatory motives constituted a motivating
factor.7 3 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor explained
that the defendant, having shown illegitimate motives, no
longer deserves "the same presumption of good faith concern-
ing its employment decisions which is accorded employers fac-
ing only circumstantial evidence of discrimination." 74
D. THE CiviL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 199175 specifically responded to
70. Id Justice Brennan explained that "[t]his balance of burdens is the
direct result of Title VII's balance of rights." Id at 245.
71. The plurality did so without diminishing the importance of the Mc-
Donnell/Burdine test. "To say that Burdine's evidentiary scheme will not
help us decide a case admittedly involving both kinds of considerations is not
to cast aspersions on the utility of that scheme in the circumstances for which
it was designed." Id. at 247.
72. "[Ihe situation before us is not one of 'shifting burdens' that we ad-
dressed in Burdine." Id at 246. "Where a decision was the product of a mix-
ture of legitimate and illegitimate motives, however, it simply makes no sense
to ask whether the legitimate reason was 'the true reason' for the decision-
which is the question asked by Burdine." Id. at 247 (citations omitted).
73. Under the single motive test, the defendant bears only the burden of
production. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
74. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor underscored the shift of the burden of persuasion to the defendant:
"the employer may be required to convince the factfinder that, despite the
smoke, there is no fire." Id
75. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The 1991 Act resembles the 1990 Act vetoed
by President Bush. See LEX K. LARSON, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, in EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 8-9 (Supp. 1992). The Senate passed the 1991 bill
by a vote of 93 to 5; the House passed an unmodified Senate version by a vote
of 381 to 38. Id at 9. President Bush signed the bill into law on November 21,
1991. Id
The Act has been described as a "patchwork of provisions" amending
many federal civil rights statutes in response to five recent Supreme Court de-
cisions narrowing plaintiff rights in employment discrimination suits. Id at 7-
8. Specifically, it amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1981 of
the reconstruction statutes, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA). Id at 7. In addition to reversing the Supreme Court deci-
sions, the Act provided for compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials,
and established a Glass Ceiling Commission. Id at 10, 48-49. One commenta-
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Price Waterhouse by changing the standard of causation in fu-
ture76 mixed motive cases. Now discriminatory motivation, if a
"motivating factor" in the decision-making process, constitutes
an illegal employment practice even though other factors may
have influenced the decision.77 The employer's showing that it
would have made the same decision even had it not considered
the discriminatory factor fails to rebut the existence of a Title
VII violation, but rather limits the plaintiff's available reme-
dies.78 This approach provides a broad definition of liability
tor described it as amounting "to a pointed message to the conservative-domi-
nated court that its overall judicial attitude on the subject of Civil Rights is
not what the Congress has in mind." Civil Rights Act of 1991-Analysis, 9 Em-
ployee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) No. 44, at S-1 (Nov. 11, 1991).
The 1991 Act, however, failed to resolve several major questions. After
two years of debate between Congress, the Bush administration and business
and civil rights leaders, the Act "appears deliberately to leave open substantial
questions, omits statutory definitions of terms such as 'business necessity' that
had been the subject of extended debate, and seems to express statutory pur-
poses that may be difficult to reconcile in specific application." David A. Cath-
cart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY § 1.01 (1992). Moreover, the legislative history of the 1991 Act contains
no committee hearings or reports, and only brief floor debate on the Act's fi-
nal provisions. Id. § 1.02.
76. The 1991 Civil Rights Act does not speak clearly on when the Act
should become applicable law, apparently as a result of legislative compromise.
Section 402(a) states that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, this Act
and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment,"
without referring to what specifically (cases pending or prior conduct) it shall
affect. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West Supp. 1992) (Historical and Statutory
Notes). Both the vetoed 1990 Civil Rights bill and the House's original version
of the 1991 Act delineated that it should apply to cases pending either on the
effective date of the Act or retroactively to the date of the pertinent nullified
Supreme Court decision. See Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 75, § 1.12.
Several federal courts of appeals have ruled on the issue, holding that the Act
does not apply retroactively, relying on the judicial presumption that absent a
clear statutory mandate, statutes are to be applied prospectively only. Id. The
Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to decide the issue of whether
the 1991 Act applies retroactively to cases that were pending when the Act be-
came law. See Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1992)
(holding that 1991 Act could not be applied retroactively to case which was
pending when legislation was enacted), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3558 (U.S.
Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-938); Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding that damage and jury trial provisions of the 1991 Act did not
apply retroactively), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3558 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993) (No.
92-757).
77. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West Supp. 1992). Section 2000e-2(m) states
that "Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful employment prac-
tice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." Id. (emphasis
added).
78. LARSON, supra note 75, at 40. If the employer can prove other reasons
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and a narrow definition of remedy.
II. GENDER STEREOTYPING UNDER TITLE VII AFTER
PRICE WATERHOUSE
The lower courts have interpreted Price Waterhouse in a
conflicting manner. While all have explicitly recognized the
decision in their analysis, few have applied the same reasoning
or achieved the same result. Moreover, the appellate courts
have not yet decided any cases under the 1991 Act.79 Thus, de-
spite the Price Waterhouse decision, courts continue to use a
wide variety of causation standards and allocations of proof.
A. THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Barbano v. Madison County 0 represents the first employ-
ment discrimination case based upon gender stereotyping de-
cided in the federal courts after Price Waterhouse. Maureen
Barbano brought suit against the county after applying and in-
terviewing for, but not receiving, the director position at the
Madison County Veterans Service Agency.8 ' During Barbano's
only interview for the job, one committee member told her that
"he would not consider 'some woman' for the position."' 2 The
same interviewer then asked about her childbearing plans and
whether her husband would approve of her transporting male
veterans as part of her job duties.8 3 Despite Barbano's repeated
for not hiring the plaintiff (in addition to the impermissible reason), the plain-
tiff may receive declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorney's fees, but
not damages or an order of hiring, promotion or reinstatement. I& The
Eighth Circuit has separated the liability and remedy phases of litigation since
the mid-1980s. In Bibbs v. Block, the Eighth Circuit justified the separation
with its interpretation of the statutory language in § 706(g), 42 U.S.C § 2000e-
5(g) (1982):
By the terms of the statute, injunctive relief may be awarded after a
finding of intentional discrimination; and affirmative relief such as re-
instatement and back pay may not be awarded if the employment de-
cision was "for any reason other than discrimination." The "but-for"
determination required for an award of affirmative relief is consistent
with Title VII's intended purpose of making persons whole for inju-
ries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.
778 F.2d 1318, 1322 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
79. See supra note 77 (discussing the Act's effective date).
80. 922 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1990).
81. Id- at 141-42.
82. Id at 141. Before Barbano entered the interview room, she heard
someone say "'Here are copies of the next resume,'" followed by the com-
ment, "'Oh, another woman.'" I&.
83. Id At one point in the interview, the exchange between interviewer
and interviewee deteriorated into an argument. When he asked Barbano a
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assertions that these questions were discriminatory and irrele-
vant, none of the other five interviewers agreed with her, dis-
agreed with the member asking the questions, or even
attempted to stop this line of questioning.84
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court finding that Madison County had discriminated against
Barbano under Title VII.85 The court found that the interview
questions and statements were clearly discriminatory8 6 and that
they directly affected the hiring decision of the committee, and
ultimately, the county board.87 The Second Circuit concluded
that "it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to con-
clude that Barbano sustained her burden of proving discrimina-
tion by the Board," given that the discriminatory interview
questions "tainted" the hiring committee's recommendation 8
and that the Board had been "put on notice.., that the Com-
mittee's recommendation was biased by discrimination."8 9
second time whether her husband would object to her "'running around the
country with men"' and followed up with the comment that he would not
want his wife to do such a thing, the plaintiff responded that she was not his
wife. Id-
84. Id
85. In its decision, the appellate court reviewed whether the record sup-
ported the lower court's findings and whether the court had applied the appro-
priate legal standards to its factual findings. Barbano, 922 F.2d at 142.
86. The court began its analysis of the discrimination issue by stating
"[f]irst, there is little doubt that Greene's statements during the interview
were discriminatory." Id at 143.
87. Although the defendant argued that the committee's actions should
not bind the Board, the court emphatically disagreed, citing Price
Waterhouse's reasoning that a collective decision-making body can discrimi-
nate through discriminatory recommendations. Id. The court believed that
Barbano's interview presented "an even stronger case of discrimination be-
cause the only recommendation the Board relied upon here was discrimina-
tory, whereas in Price Waterhouse, not all of the evaluations used in the
decision-making process were discriminatory." Id at 144.
88. Id.
89. Id The court stressed the importance of notice to the Board of the
tainted committee interview because of the governing body's heavy reliance on
delegatory process and its inaction when faced with information of the flawed
process. As one interviewer testified, the Board regularly relies on a commit-
tee system to accomplish its work and "usually accept[s]" committee recom-
mendations, especially unanimous ones. Id at 145. Barbano, who attended the
public meeting where the Board ratified the hiring decision, supplied the no-
tice herself. Before the Board acted on the employment resolution, Barbano
objected and asked board members if the committee had asked the same kinds
of questions of male applicants. Id at 144. The committee chair responded
that he had not asked such questions; the other committee members remained
silent. Id. The chairman of the board, who as an ex officio member of the
interviewing committee observed Barbano's interview, did not reply nor did
his fellow board members question him about the allegations. Id. This lack of
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Treating the tainted interview as direct evidence 9° of sex
discrimination, the Second Circuit then turned to the issue of
causation. It affirmed the district court's decision to shift the
burden to the defendants to prove "by a preponderance of the
evidence that, absent the discrimination, they would not have
hired Barbano for the position."9 1 After reviewing Barbano's
qualifications in light of the listed job requirements and com-
paring them to those of the candidate selected for the position,
the court of appeals once again agreed with the district court
that the employer had failed to prove that "they [sic] would not
have hired Barbano even if they had not discriminated against
her."92 Hence, by treating stereotyping interview questions as
investigation on the part of the board members, coupled with their complete
reliance on the committee's recommendation, led the court to conclude that
"the Board was willing to rely on the Committee's recommendation even if
Barbano had been discriminated against during her interview." Id
90. The defendant treated Barbano's evidence as circumstantial and ar-
gued that the burden of proof should not shift to the employer. The court
found that the appellants "misapprehend[ed] the nature of Barbano's proof
and thus the governing legal standard." Barbano, 922 F.2d at 144-45. The Sec-
ond Circuit recognized that the classification of evidence as direct or indirect
provides the '"key inquiry" for it determines when the burden of proof moves
from the plaintiff to the defendant. Id. at 145. The court ruled that the bur-
den shifts "[o]nce the plaintiff establishe[s] by direct evidence that an illegiti-
mate factor played a motivating or substantial role in an employment
decision." Id. (citation omitted). To apply this rule, the court invoked a two-
step process that began with classifying the evidence as direct and then assess-
ing the causal relationship. The Second Circuit classified proof as direct evi-
dence where "it shows that the impermissible criterion played some part in
the decision-making process." Id (emphasis added). The court then defined
causation as "whether the evidence shows that the impermissible criterion
played a motivating or substantial part in the hiring decision." Id. (emphasis
added).
91. Id- at 144. In considering the defendant's proof, the Second Circuit
drew from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse: "the
employer may be required to convince the fact finder that, despite the smoke,
there is no fire." Id at 145. The court clearly believed that the district court's
role as trier of fact required it to "have an opinion" or "make a finding" on the
reasons offered by the employer for not hiring Barbano (contrary to the de-
fendant's assertion that to do so is to 'impermissibly substitute its own opin-
ion on the matter' "). Id
92. Id at 146. The court specifically focused on the applicants' objective
education and employment qualifications as they related to the job description
and distinguished the subjective issues. For example, the court viewed
Barbano's three year work experience as a social welfare examiner for
Madison County as an important qualification, as she was familiar with the ar-
ray of social assistance programs and agencies available to veterans. Id at 145-
46. In contrast, the selected candidate's present employment as a school bus
driver and part-time bartender at the American Legion indicated to the court
his lack of relevant knowledge for the director position. Id. In addition to her
work experience, Barbano was working toward a degree in human services at
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direct evidence of discrimination, the Second Circuit found a
Title VII violation.
B. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
In contrast to the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit ruled
in Bruno v. City of Crown Point93 that similar interview ques-
tions did not violate Title VII. Micolette M. Bruno sued the
City of Crown Point after interviewing for and not receiving a
job as a paramedic. During her only interview for the job, the
interviewer asked Bruno about the number of children she had
and would have,94 her child care arrangements, and how her
husband would feel about the job.95 Although the interviewer
testified that he held the same family concerns96 for all appli-
cants regardless of gender, he admitted that he did not ask
male applicants the same questions posed to Bruno.9 7
The Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court's finding of
sex discrimination under Title VII,98 "[b]ecause substantial evi-
the time of the interview, while the selected candidate's education consisted
only of a high school equivalency degree and some extension classes in man-
agement. I& at 146. Moreover, given the county's explicit personnel policy,
the committee should have considered Barbano's residency in the county as an
advantage. Id- Finally, although Barbano had a short military career and she
had not participated in the American Legion like the selected candidate, both
Barbano and the selected candidate received honorable discharges. Id
93. 950 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 2998 (1992).
94. Bruno contended that the interviewer asked her whether it was "time
to have more children." Id- at 358. The interviewer "categorically denied ever
suggesting that Bruno was about due for some more children," although he
agreed with Bruno's accounting of the rest of the interview. Id.
95. I&
96. The interviewer asserted that he should learn about a prospective em-
ployee's plans for child care because he wanted parent paramedics "'to come
to work knowing that their kids are taken care of,'" so they "'can concentrate
on doing their job and not have to worry about the safety and welfare of their
children.'" Id He contended that Bruno's case posed special problems be-
cause as her husband also worked as a paramedic, "'the kids might not see
mom or dad maybe four waking hours every couple of days."' Id- at 359. In-
terestingly, the trial court allowed testimony regarding Bruno's resignation
from a former supervisory position (ostensibly to reduce her work schedule
from 60 to 40 hours per week) and the interviewer's blackboard demonstration
of the extent of Bruno's potential work week when combining her present
with her potential future job. Id. at 357-58.
97. Id. at 359. Although the interviewer testified that he asked all appli-
cants about their family status, the interview notes of only one of the other
three male candidates indicates a response. Id- Furthermore, the interviewer
testified that "he did not recall asking any male applicant how his spouse felt
about the 24-hour shifts or whether they expected to have children in the fu-
ture." I&
98. The court, finding the magistrate judge's denial of the employer's mo-
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dence does not support the jury's conclusion that Bruno's sex
was a determining factor" in the decision to hire a man instead
of Bruno.99 In its decision, the court analyzed the case from
both the mixed and single motive perspectives. The court con-
cluded that to uphold the lower court finding, the plaintiff
must have shown that sex played a motivating part in the em-
ployment decision.10° In considering whether the family-ori-
ented interview questions asked only of Bruno010 qualified as
direct evidence, the court concluded that while they belied gen-
der stereotyping,10 2 "[m]erely showing the questions were
asked . . . is not sufficient to prove intentional discrimina-
tion. 10 3 Rather, the court required that Bruno show "substan-
tial evidence" that the interviewer relied on the gender
stereotyping questions when making its decision not to hire
her; it found that she had failed to meet this burden.'1 4
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict "brief and providing little in the
way of specifics," chose to review the decision de novo. Ia at 361.
99. I at 357. The Seventh Circuit stated: "we determine whether the
evidence is sufficient to support the verdict," and that "the evidence support-
ing the verdict must be substantial; a mere scintilla of evidence will not suf-
fice." I& at 361.
100. 1I The court noted that plaintiffs may meet this burden with either
direct or indirect evidence. I&
101. The interviewer denied having asked Bruno particular family-oriented
questions. Id at 358. Moreover, he stated that he discussed family status with
all of the applicants. I& at 359. Despite the court's characterization of Bruno's
impeachment of interview testimony with earlier deposition answers as "dubi-
ous at best," it concluded that "when we view all this evidence in the light
most favorable to Bruno, we conclude that the jury could have found that Pyle
did not ask the male applicants how their spouses felt about working a 24-hour
shift on an ambulance or whether they planned to have more children." Id. at
361-62.
102. "The fact that Pyle asked only Bruno family-oriented questions
reveals that those questions were based on sex stereotypes-namely, that fe-
males are the primary care providers for children and that the wife's career is
secondary to the husband's." Bruno, 950 F.2d at 362.
103. Il.
104. Id Specifically, the court of appeals looked at the interviewer's con-
cern about the time conflicts between Bruno's and her husband's jobs, intimat-
ing that the committee asked only Bruno family-oriented questions because
"[t]here is no evidence that any other applicant was faced with this unique and
demanding situation." Ia The court found that Bruno's answers appeared to
have reassured the interviewer, even though earlier in the opinion it acknowl-
edged the unreliability of answers to such questions since "the interviewee has
to assume that the employer wants to hear" a particular answer. Id- The
court then drew its own inferences from the notes made during the interview
(" 'No problem w/24/48 hr shifts'" and "'No problem w/child care' "), surmis-
ing that they could indicate either the interviewer's or Bruno's conclusion that
Bruno's family life would not affect her work. Id- The Seventh Circuit thus
concluded that the record did not establish that the employer relied on sex
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Having found Bruno's evidence insufficient to meet direct
evidence standards, the court evaluated the proof as indirect ev-
idence. It held that while she had established a prima facie
case of sex discrimination, 0 5 the employer articulated "several
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for hiring" someone
else, 06 and that Bruno, in turn, failed to prove the reasons
merely pretextual.10 7 Therefore, neither Bruno's direct nor her
indirect evidence of the employer's gender stereotyped ques-
stereotypes, because "[n]either inference implies that Pyle concluded Bruno's
sex rendered her ineligible for the job." Id.
Judge Easterbrook vigorously dissented from the majority's de novo scru-
tiny of the facts in this manner.
My colleagues make some solid points in favor of Pyle and the City.
A verdict in their favor could not be disturbed. When the inferences
cut both ways, the trier of fact is entitled to decide. Both the jury
evaluating the § 1983 claim and the judge assessing the Title VII claim
accepted the inferences in Bruno's favor. We should affirm the
judgement.
Bruno v. City of Crown Point, Ind., 950 F.2d 355, 365 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easter-
brook, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 363. The court used the McDonnell/Burdine burden shifting
method. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
106. Bruno, 950 F.2d at 363. The interviewer testified that he hired the
candidate "because he had the least experience . . .and therefore could be
molded in the Crown Point way of doing things," he had made a good impres-
sion on the staff during a student training period with them, and because he
had "clicked" with the interviewer. Id
107. Id. The court found it "logical for Pyle to want employees that could
be molded into the Crown Point way of doing things" because Pyle was the
first and only director of a department of seven people. Id. On the basis of
the interview notes stating that Wagner "'could be molded'" and that the sec-
ond-ranked candidate was "'set in his ways,'" the court concluded that "Pyle
obviously had a trained team in place and wanted the new person to fit in."
Id. at 363-64. The court discarded Bruno's theory that the employer's articula-
tion constituted a pretext as "too farfetched and simply implausible given the
evidence in this case." Id. Using strongly biased language, the court reasoned
that "Bruno's attorney admitted at oral argument that, in order to accept
Bruno's argument of pretext, the jury had to conclude that Pyle's effort to dis-
criminate against Bruno was so well-thought-out that he hired the least exper-
ienced male paramedic over six more experienced men, all so he could concoct
the pretextual argument that he wanted to mold his new paramedic into the
Crown Point way of doing things." Id. (emphasis added).
In contrast, Judge Easterbrook concluded that "[a] jury also could find
this explanation fabricated, a pretext-age discrimination on top of sex dis-
crimination. When asked just what the 'Crown Point way of doing things' is,
Pyle had no answer. He conceded that the paramedics operate under the di-
rection of a local hospital." Id. at 365 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Once
again, arguing that the ultimate power should rest with the jury and trial
judge, Easterbrook urged that "[i]f the employer is trying to hide its real rea-
son, that effort-coupled with the evidence making up the employee's case-
may convince the trier of fact that the real reason needed to be hidden because
it was discriminatory." Id.
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tions asked only of female candidates met the test of causing or,
at least, playing a motivating role in, the hiring process. L08
III. TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF CAUSE
AND EFFECT IN GENDER STEREOTYPED
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Sharp contrasts in the analytical frameworks and ultimate
decisions of these federal courts point to the need for a uniform
system of deciding employment discrimination cases based
upon stereotyping. Barbano and Bruno, along with Price
Waterhouse, show that the causation standard, burden of proof
allocation, and evidentiary requirements constitute the key ele-
ments for analyzing such mixed motive cases. Although Con-
gress intended to resolve the causation standard conflict in the
1991 Civil Rights Act, questions of interpretation will undoubt-
edly arise as the judiciary decides what constitutes a "motivat-
ing factor," how to prove it, and who bears the burden. This
Note proposes an analytical method that recognizes the close
relationship between evidence and causation by combining the
evidentiary requirements of the Second Circuit with the causa-
tion standard of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
A. STANDARDS OF CAUSATION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
The federal judiciary clearly demonstrated in Bruno and
Barbano its conflicting notions of how to link discriminatory in-
tent with outcome. The Seventh Circuit, purportedly applying
the more liberal "motivating factor" test, 0 9 found no Title VII
violation, while the Second Circuit, using the same test, did find
a violation."30 Thus, the expressed causation standard as ap-
plied did not necessarily evince the level of proximate cause the
courts actually required to explain why the two women did not
get the jobs they sought.
This difference in application turns on the courts' comfort
level with the nexus between the injurious act-gender stere-
otyping-and the resulting injury--employment discrimination.
108. MdL The majority reasoned that "[t]he plaintiff still must prove that
the employer based his decision on the sex stereotypes implicit in such ques-
tions when directed only to women." Id& Easterbrook sharply differed with
this conclusion: "[t]hese paternalistic questions, asked only of women, show
that he thought about men and women differently and allowed the jury to in-
fer that he believes a woman's place is in the home." I&L (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
109. Bruno, 950 F.2d at 361.
110. Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 1990).
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The Seventh Circuit saddled Bruno with the double burden of
proving that her sex amounted to "a motivating factor"'' and
"a determining factor,"" 2 a much more difficult standard to
prove. In doing so, the court accepted only a very close causal
connection between the discriminatory interview and the hiring
decision. In contrast, the Second Circuit characterized the
"tainted" interview as the proximate cause of the decision not
to hire Barbano.113 These conflicting outcomes indicate not the
need for a new standard but rather the need for judicial con-
sensus on the meaning of the "motivating factor" test cited by
the Price Waterhouse plurality" 4 and codified in the 1991 Civil
Rights Act.115
B. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS AND THEIR RELATION
TO CAUSATION
The role of direct and indirect evidence in showing that the
discriminatory interviews constituted Title VII violations
proved critical to the courts' applications of causation stan-
dards. In Bruno, the Seventh Circuit refused to construe the
interview questions as direct evidence of discrimination because
the plaintiffs did not produce "substantial evidence" that the
interviewers relied upon the answers when making the
ultimate hiring decisions." 6 Instead, the court resorted to the
indirect evidentiary framework of McDonnell/Burdine and rea-
soned that while the plaintiff successfully shifted the burdens
of production to the defendants, she failed to meet her burdens
of persuasion in proving that the employers' alleged nondis-
criminatory reasons amounted to "mere pretext."117
The Second Circuit, in stark contrast, construed the inter-
view questions as direct evidence of sex discrimination and pro-
ceeded to apply the Price Waterhouse mixed motive analytical
framework.118 In Barbano, the court appeared to reason that
such questions, when asked only of one gender, created a pre-
sumption of gender stereotyping both in thought and action.119
111. Bruno, 950 F.2d at 361.
112. Id. at 357.
113. Barbano, 922 F.2d at 144.
114. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989).
115. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West Supp. 1992).
116. Bruno, 950 F.2d at 362.
117. Id. at 363-64.
118. Barbano, 922 F.2d at 145.
119. See id. The court appeared to follow the reasoning of one commenta-
tor, who likened finding discrimination to solving an algebraic equation:
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The court required no additional, explicit proof of reliance on
the answers.
The Seventh and Second Circuits took diametrically differ-
ent approaches when considering the evidence, one formulaic
and rigid, the other practical and inclusive. The Second Circuit
deduced from the fact that the interviewer asked stereotyped
questions only of the female candidate that the discriminatory
bias permeated not only the interview process but the ultimate
decisionmaking one as well. The Seventh Circuit, in contrast,
compartmentalized the stereotyping behavior, separating the
thinking that created the questions from that which formed the
ultimate decision. Thus, the Seventh Circuit required a thresh-
old of proof so "direct" that a plaintiff could rarely, if ever,
meet her burden of production.-2 0
Moreover, the courts' categorizations of the proof as direct
or indirect affected how they actually applied the causation
standard. The Seventh Circuit's high evidentiary threshold es-
sentially precluded the plaintiff from showing that the discrim-
inatory interview played a motivating role in the employment
decision. Instead, the court's single motive analysis effectively
forced her to show that the interview questions amounted to a
determining factor. The Second Circuit's evidentiary threshold,
in contrast, invoked the mixed motive framework which al-
lowed the plaintiff's direct evidence to apply to a less exacting
causal standard, thereby permitting her to shift the burden to
the defendant to prove how it would have made the same deci-
sion regardless of the discriminatory interview. The courts'
proximate cause concerns thus fueled the standards for evi-
dence and causation.
C. TOWARD A UNIFORM STANDARD OF RELATING CAUSE AND
EFFECT IN GENDER STEREOTYPED EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
As the Bruno and Barbano decisions illustrate, causation
standards, evidentiary requirements, and proof allocations af-
fect one another; changing one element has an impact on the
"[B]ut when one proceeds to cancel out the common characteristics of the two
classes being compared (married men and married women) ... the cancelled-
out element proves to be that of married status, and sex remains the only op-
erative factor in the equation." ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, 1 EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: SEX § 11.22, at 3-10 (1992).
120. This heavy burden of production ignores the practical difficulty that
plaintiffs are rarely in the position to produce direct evidence of employment
discrimination. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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others. Standardizing one, as the 1991 Civil Rights Act in-
tended with the motivating factor causation standard, will not
necessarily result in different decisions on gender stereotyping.
Rather, Congress's attempt to render Price Waterhouse more
"plaintiff friendly" may instead ignite unintended changes in
the remaining two elements. Thus, to harmonize the treatment
of employment discrimination cases asserting gender stereotyp-
ing, this Note advocates a unified framework of all three
elements.
1. Evidentiary Requirements
Courts should treat family status interview questions asked
only of women applicants as direct evidence' 21 of the em-
ployer's discriminatory motivation. In doing so, courts would
immediately proceed to a mixed motive analysis, thereby avoid-
ing the McDonnell/Burdine approach. By explicitly adopting
the approach the Second Circuit implicitly utilized in
Barbano,22 the courts would achieve two distinct aims. First,
they would eliminate barriers to litigating the subtle and per-
sistent discrimination that continues to plague women in seek-
ing employment opportunities.2 3 In this manner the remedial
function of Title VII's private cause of action would operate
more effectively by maximizing enforcement opportunities
without burdening the regulatory apparatus. 124
121. In a subsequent case, the Second Circuit concluded that the term di-
rect evidence "is an unfortunate choice of terminology for the sort of proof
needed to establish a 'mixed-motives' case." Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
958 F.2d 1176, 1185 (2d Cir.) (a case of age discrimination under New York's
Human Rights Law), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 82 (1992).
"Direct" and "indirect" describe not the quality of the evidence
presented, but the manner in which the plaintiff proves his case.
Strictly speaking, the only "direct evidence" that a decision was made
"because of" an impermissible factor would be an admission by the
decisionmnaker such as "I fired him because he was too old." Even a
highly-probative statement like "You're fired, old man" still requires
the factfinder to draw the inference that the plaintiff's age had a
causal relationship to the decision.
Id- Instead the court referred to a "more focused proof of discrimination"
than the McDonnell Douglas prima facie evidence. Id.
122. See 922 F.2d at 144-45.
123. Congress intended Title VII to "eradicat[e] discrimination throughout
the economy and mak[e] persons whole for injuries suffered through past dis-
crimination." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court has noted that "imn the implementation of
[employment] decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial
discrimination, subtle or otherwise." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
124. Some might argue that this standard would open the floodgates for
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Second, a broader definition of direct evidence would in-
fuse judicial thinking with a more realistic reflection of current
methods of discrimination. Since the 1970s, when the courts
began to interpret the 1964 Civil Rights Act, explicit edicts
against hiring women have given way to more subtle forms of
discrimination based on the stereotypes deeply rooted in our
culture.m5 By concluding that employers who ask family status
questions only of women invoke gender stereotypes and neces-
sarily rely on them when making the ultimate employment de-
cision, courts would tear down the artificial wall1 26 between
direct and indirect evidence built by years of judicial
interpretation.
2. Causation Standard
Under a mixed motive analysis, courts should apply the
motivating factor test used by the Price Waterhouse plurality
and codified in the 1991 Act. By using this standard, the courts
establish a causal link between discriminatory intent and out-
come appropriate to Title VII's original mandate and the ex-
plicit affirmation contained in the 1991 Act. A motivating
factor standard, applied to the plaintiff's burden of proof,
places the proximate cause close enough to the injury to satisfy
the need for causality, yet within the pragmatic evidentiary
realm of today's plaintiffs. Clearly the "motivating factor" test
places a heavier burden of proof on the employer than the ex-
isting "but for" and "substantial factor" tests, but appropriately
gender stereotyping claims under Title VII and render the private cause of ac-
tion useless under the weight of excessive litigation. While treating evidence
of gender-specific family status questions as direct evidence of employer gen-
der stereotyping will undoubtedly increase the number of claims brought
against employers, it will also assuredly increase employers' awareness
(through litigation and settlement) of the need to treat male and female appli-
cants equally. While employers will, in the short term, incur additional ex-
pense in defending themselves from suit, they will learn in the long run to
insulate themselves from claims by either asking no family status questions or
asking them equally of men and women applicants.
Furthermore, this approach coincides with the policy direction set by Con-
gress in the 1991 Act. By increasing the potential use of jury trials and "eas-
ing" the standard for proving a Title VII violation (thereby improving the
chances for an award of attorney's fees), Congress expressed its support for
remedying gender-stereotyped discrimination through increased resort to pri-
vate suit. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2 (West Supp. 1992).
125. For examples of gender stereotyping and its effects on working wo-
men, see supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
126. Courts should be wary of "creating walls too steep for meritorious
claimants to climb." Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (age
discrimination).
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so. Employers usually control the crucial factual information
for determining the role the gender-stereotyped questions
played in decisionmaking. Moreover, Congress stated clearly in
the 1991 Act that the causal nexus suggested in the 1964 Act's
"because of" term did not require direct precision but rather a
proximate relationship.
3. Burden of Proof Allocation
Once the plaintiff has provided direct proof that a discrimi-
natory factor motivated the employment decision, the burden
should then shift to the employer, under mixed motive analy-
sis, to articulate why the discriminatory interview did not moti-
vate the employment decision. The employer would shoulder
both the burdens of production and persuasion to show the
court how other legitimate factors actually motivated the em-
ployment decision.127 The burden of persuasion rests appropri-
ately on the defendant for not only does it possess superior
access to crucial evidence linking thought and action, but the
plaintiff's showing of illegitimate motives denies the employer
a "presumption of good faith" in its decisionmaking. In turn,
the plaintiff would carry the burden of persuasion in rebutting
the defendant's proffered motives.
Applying this framework to the facts of Barbano, the Sec-
ond Circuit would have produced the same result but by a more
explicit analytical process. Rather than implicitly concluding
that family status questions asked only of women constitute di-
rect evidence, thereby collapsing the issues of motivating
thought and action, the Second Circuit would have shown ex-
plicitly how gender-stereotyped thoughts can translate into
gender-discriminating action. 28
In contrast, had the Seventh Circuit applied this suggested
framework, it would have found for the plaintiff Bruno. By in-
itially classifying the interview questions as direct evidence of
an illicit motivating factor, the court would have avoided con-
fusing the single and mixed-motive frameworks and their dis-
parate underlying premises. Instead it would have immediately
shifted the burden to the employer and applied the motivating
factor test to the plaintiff's evidence. Finally, as Judge Easter-
127. Under the 1991 Act, the employer's success at proving other legitimate
factors would free it from an assessment of damages, not a finding of a Title
VII violation. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
128. Barbano, 922 F.2d at 145-46.
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brook suggested in his dissenting opinion, 2 9 under this ap-
proach the appeals court appropriately would have deferred to
the lower court's factfinding and to Congress's intent to "eradi-
cate employment discrimination"'130 by recognizing the relation-
ship between gender-stereotyped thoughts and gender-biased
actions, as well as that between evidence and causation.
CONCLUSION
By using the unified analytical framework suggested in this
Note, courts will send a strong message to employers that stere-
otyping, while prevalent in society, has no place in employment
decisions. The federal judiciary would also reconcile the incon-
sistencies presently evolving from their interpretation of Price
Waterhouse's "murky" approach to causation. Most impor-
tantly, utilization of this framework now would reflect the
standards recognized in the 1991 Civil Rights Act and expedi-
ently bring them to bear on the important cases presently
before the courts.
129. Bruno, 950 F.2d at 365.
130. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
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